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The introduction of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) in Chile in
October 2002 introduced more comprehensive unemployment protection while
decreasing the opportunity costs of job change. Being the first to empirically
investigate the effect of UISA on employment duration, this paper examines (i) whether
the introduction of UISA affected employment duration among formal private sector
workers, and (ii) the magnitude of this effect. The analysis is performed on longitudinal
social protection data and uses survival analysis techniques, including non-parametric,
semi-parametric and parametric analysis, and competing-risk models. The paper finds
that workers affiliated to the scheme show an increased hazard ratio of leaving
employment, or accelerated time to employment termination. The effect is larger for
workers becoming unemployed or inactive compared to workers changing jobs. The
results provide strong support that the introduction of UISA led to shorter employment
duration and higher mobility of the workforce in Chile.
JEL codes: C41, J63, J64, J65
Keywords: Unemployment insurance savings accounts; Employment duration; Survival
analysis; Chile1 Introduction
The introduction of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) in October
2002 changed labor market conditions for formal private sector workers in Chile. UISA
are individual savings accounts to which employer and employee transfer a share of
the worker’s salary for possible unemployment spells. Before the introduction,
unemployment protection was practically limited to severance pay in case of job
termination due to economic necessities of the firm. Additionally, high opportunity
costs were involved in job change, and employers had to deal with rigid labor market
regulations. After the introduction of UISA, the access to and amount of benefits
transferred to workers in case of unemployment or inactivity increased, and oppor-
tunity costs of workers changing employment decreased, while ad-hoc obligations of
employers to lay off workforce were reduced.
While incentives to leave unemployment have been studied in this context (Reyes,
van Ours, & Vodopivec 2011; Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco 2012), this study is the first
one to my knowledge to empirically investigate the effect of UISA on employment
duration. In this paper I fill the gap by using longitudinal social protection data
containing information of employment duration of formal private sector workersNagler; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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introduction of UISA affected employment duration among formal private sector
workers, and (ii) the magnitude of this effect. Following the policy introduction, I
expect that workers reacted to the changes by reduced employment duration.
I conduct an empirical analysis using survival analysis techniques to analyze employ-
ment duration: in the first part I focus exclusively on the failure of the employment
relation: if the current employment relation was terminated, irrespective of the event
that follows. In the second part I apply a competing-risk model, where the different
following events after employment termination are taken into account.
The results confirm that workers affiliated to the scheme show an increased hazard
ratio of leaving employment, or accelerated time to employment termination, suggest-
ing shorter employment duration and higher mobility of the workforce: they have a
higher hazard of leaving employment in the Cox model, or accelerated time to failure
in the parametric analysis, with this effect being statistically significant throughout the
analysis. In the competing-risk analysis, the outcome is equally significant if the follow-
ing event is a new employment relation or unemployment, and for the final regression
model in the case of inactivity. The effect is larger for workers becoming unemployed
or inactive compared to workers changing jobs.
The paper is organized as follows: After the introduction, Section 2 describes the
Chilean UISA scheme, followed by a literature review on severance pay and labor
mobility in Section 3. Section 4 specifies the database used for the analysis, including
descriptive statistics of relevant variables. Section 5 describes the method used for the
analysis. In Section 6 I apply survival analysis techniques for the empirical analysis and
discuss the results: I start with the non-parametric analysis using the Kaplan-Meier
estimator, continue with the semi-parametric Cox model and parametric models, before
finalizing the analysis with competing-risk models where three different possible
endpoints are taken into account. The final section concludes.
2 The Chilean UISA scheme - context and description
Before the introduction of UISA, severance pay1 was the principal form of unemployment
protection in Chile for workers dismissed due to Labor Code 161,2 complemented by
benefits financed by Social Security and additional minor support programs. Severance
pay led to a rigid labor market while offering limited protection to unemployed workers,
as only workers dismissed due to economic necessities of the firm received benefits during
unemployment spells, often without the guarantee of payout3. The complementary
benefits by Social Security were minimal and independent of previous salaries4. Further
support for the unemployed was provided through workfare programs for low-income
workers, hiring subsidies for firms, unemployment insurance for domestic helpers, and
job search assistance (Acevedo, Eskenasi, & Pagés 2006)5.
The political and economic context of UISA introduction was based on two major
events: i) the political change in 1990, when democracy was restored in Chile, and center
and left-wing parties formed a coalition giving priority to improving workers’ position,
leading to an extension in severance pay and ii) the sharp increase in the unemployment
rate end of the 1990s due to a deterioration in terms of trade and external demand, and
the negative impact of the Asian crisis, leaving many workers unemployed and without
means to smooth consumption (Acevedo, Eskenasi, & Pagés 2006).
Nagler IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 3 of 252013, 2:9
http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/9The development and design of the new scheme involved various parties with
different concerns and interests: while the main governmental concern included the
avoidance of moral hazard, employers were worried about labor market flexibility, and
workers, represented by labor unions, did not want to give up “hard won rights” as they
considered the extension of severance pay after the political change in Chile
(Sehnbruch 2004). With the increase in unemployment protection in terms of access to
and amount of benefits transferred, while limiting moral hazard through individualized
accounts (Reyes, van Ours, & Vodopivec 2011), and moderately relaxing the severance
pay obligations, the new unemployment policy was approved 2001 in Congress with a
high political consensus, and subsequently implemented in October 2002 (Acevedo,
Eskenasi, & Pagés 2006).
The new Chilean unemployment protection is based on two components: i) individual
savings accounts for each worker that take the form of self-insurance, backed up by ii) a
solidarity fund (SF) that functions similarly to an unemployment insurance based on risk-
pooling. The scheme covers all private sector workers over 18 years of age, with either a
permanent or a temporary contract. Enrolment into the new scheme is compulsory for all
workers starting a new employment contract after October 2002, therefore avoiding
adverse selection. Workers who started a new employment before the introduction date
can voluntarily switch to the new system, but only very few decided to do so6.
The financing of UISA is regulated differently by contract type. For employees with a
permanent contract UISA contributions are financed by both employer and employee
(0.6 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively), and are split between the individual
accounts to save up for possible unemployment spells of the worker (2.2 percent) and
the common SF (0.8 percent). The latter is also co-financed by the government with
approximately USD 14 million per year (Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco 2012). For employees
with a temporary contract only the employer contributes to the savings account with
3.0 percent and workers do not have access to the SF7, 8.
Transfer of benefits was considerably extended in terms of eligibility and total
amount transferred. Although the previously existing unemployment subsidy lasting for
twelve months was replaced by transfers lasting for a maximum of five months, the
current support system is more generous, translating into overall higher transfers. The
accumulated benefits in the individual accounts are transferred to workers terminating
their employment for any cause,9 conditional that they worked for a pre-defined
amount of time: six months for workers with temporary contracts and twelve months
for workers with permanent contracts, continuous or discontinuous, since they became
affiliated to the scheme or since the last time they requested and were granted benefits
(Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco 2012). Workers with permanent contracts losing their job
due to Labor Code 161 are equally better protected, as they have, apart from the
severance pay and their accumulated savings, access to the solidarity fund in case of low
individual savings and therefore access to the insurance component of the scheme. In this
case access to the SF is optional, and if workers decide to receive benefits they have to
accept additional conditions: i) they have to pay monthly visits to the municipal employ-
ment office, ii) they must be willing to join in training programs and iii) they must accept
job offers paying at least 50 percent of their pre-unemployment wage (Reyes, van Ours, &
Vodopivec 2011). Finally, workers who do not become unemployed during their working
life receive their accumulated account balance when retiring (Sehnbruch 2004).
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introduction. For all events (job change, unemployment, inactivity, retirement, and
death of the worker) the current situation with UISA is more beneficial for the worker
or his/her dependents: for a change in employment, opportunity costs decreased, while
in all other cases accumulated savings are directly transferred to the worker or the
dependents.
Since the unemployment protection reform, severance pay continues to be paid out
in case of dismissal due to economic necessities of the firm, with the possibility of
deducting accumulated savings from the severance pay liabilities, equally improving the
situation of employers.
3 Severance pay and labor mobility - what do we know?
Severance pay is a widespread form of unemployment protection, particularly in
developing countries (Vodopivec 2004; 2013) due to large informal labor markets and
limited administrative and financial capacities to introduce unemployment insurance
(Holzman, Pouget, Vodopivec, & Weber 2011). Severance pay is however often
criticized and considered an inappropriate option for income protection: while sever-
ance pay intends to provide compensation for job loss and to stabilize the economy by
discouraging layoffs and encouraging long-term work relations, it distorts the behavior
of workers and firms, and often provides workers with limited protection during
unemployment spells (Feldstein & Altman 2007; Hopenhayn & Hatchondo 2012).
Labor market distortions are caused by negative effects on both worker accession and
separation, and consequently on labor turnover and mobility10. Severance pay increases
firing costs and reduces consequently the probability that workers become unemployed,
but also hinders job creation and prolongs unemployment spells (Blanchard 2000; Nickell
1997). It further decreases the dynamics of structural change due to reduced mobility of
the workforce as firms face high payment obligations (Calmfors & Holmlund 2000). A
number of studies additionally confirm the link between higher job security and lower
employment levels11, 12. Limited protection can result through restricted access to
severance pay, as workers often face strict regulations of severance pay eligibility, and may
involve long judicial processes if firms try to evade their payment obligations. Further-
more firms which are in financial distress or go bankrupt may be unable to transfer the
required amount to their previous employees (Acevedo, Eskenasi, & Pagés 2006).Table 1 Benefit changes before and after UISA introduction
Event Before UISA After UISA
Job change Loss of accumulated rights to
severance pay
Loss of severance pay (as before), keeps accumulated
savings in UISA account
Unemployment Severance pay if job loss occurred due
to Labor Code 161
Severance pay (as before), transfer of accumulated
savings (maximum five months), solidarity fund
if applicableAll other cases: nothing
Inactivity Severance pay if job loss occurred due
to Labor Code 161
Severance pay (as before), transfer of accumulated
savings (maximum five months)
All other cases: nothing
Retirement Nothing Transfer of accumulated savings given account
balance is positive
Death Nothing Transfer of accumulated savings given account
balance is positive to surviving dependents
Source: by author based on Acevedo, Eskenasi, & Pagés (2006).
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form of unemployment protection can be beneficial not only for the individual worker,
but for the economy as a whole. Higher unemployment protection entails, for example,
positive outcomes for workers through consumption smoothing and the promotion of
higher reemployment stability (Wulfgramm & Fervers 2013), and for the economy
through higher productivity levels (Acemoglu & Shimer 2000).
In the case of Chile severance pay implied financial support to a restricted group of
workers during unemployment spells, as only workers who lost their employment
before the expiration of the contractual agreement due to economic or other needs of
the firm received benefits. What is more, severance pay obligations did not guarantee
the payout of the severance liabilities, as previously explained13. In addition, workers
lost their accumulated rights to severance pay in case of job change, leading to high
opportunity costs: on the one hand due to reduced transfers that are based on tenure
in case of job loss, on the other hand due to a more likely lay off during bad economic
times, as workers with less tenure are “cheaper” to fire. In the case of Chile
Montenegro & Pagés (2004) show that severance pay resulted in increased protection
rights for older and high-skilled workers, while it reduced labor market opportunities
for younger and unskilled workers in the period from 1960 to 1998 through the link
with tenure.
Empirical papers on the effects of UISA after the transition from severance pay to
UISA, and particularly on changes in workers’ behavior are still rare and many
researchers have relied on simulations instead14. One empirical paper by Kugler (2002)
documents the transition from severance pay to UISA in Colombia in 1990. Her results
show that although UISA partly substitute employer insurance with self-insurance in
form of lower wages, the scheme smoothes consumption for the unemployed. The
introduction of UISA also reduces distortions in the labor market by increasing both
hiring and dismissals, and leads to higher labor mobility.
A number of papers have analyzed the transition in Chile in a more general context:
Acevedo, Eskenasi, & Pagés (2006) discuss the political, social, and economic situation
in which this program was implemented and assess the challenges. Sehnbruch (2004)
concentrates on embedding the new Chilean unemployment scheme into the context
of Latin American labor market legislation, while Sehnbruch (2006) examines how the
scheme works in practice and whether it can serve as a model for other emerging and
developing economics. Berstein, Fajnzylber, & Gana (2012) analyze the Chilean UISA
scheme as a whole and provide an overview of outcomes and reforms since its imple-
mentation. More specific issues have been addressed by Reyes, van Ours, & Vodopivec
(2011) who analyze the job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients and
Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco (2012) who look specifically at the change in search efforts of
unemployed workers before and after the UISA reform in May 2009.
The effect of UISA on employment duration (and consequently on labor mobility)
for Chile is hitherto unclear and provides little evidence: while Berstein, Contreras &
Benvin (2008) show that formal private sector workers value the new unemployment
benefits more than its cost,15 limited knowledge about UISA and its design could
however work against a change in labor mobility (Poblete 2011). A first study by Reyes
(2005) on duration of employment contracts using life tables suggests that workers
affiliated to UISA show shorter employment duration with 33 percent “surviving” the
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then focuses on workers below the age of 30 to reduce selection bias and finds that
workers affiliated to UISA still show a difference of 7 percentage points compared to
workers not affiliated. In his paper the author uses a different database16 and concen-
trates specifically on methodological issues to assess the question.
4 Database and descriptive statistics
The panel database used for this analysis is the Chilean EPS database,17 a longitudinal
survey with questions on the individual and household level about the Chilean labor
market and social protection system. The survey was conducted in 2002, 2004, 2006
and 2009 and contains retrospective data since January 198018. The first round was
conducted in 2002, and was drawn from a frame of 8.1 million current and former
members of the Chilean pension system included for at least one month in the
timeframe 1980–2001 containing 17,246 individuals, 937 of them reported by surviving
relatives. The survey was extended in 2004 with non-participating individuals, complet-
ing the base sample, and has been since then representative on the national and
regional level for the entire Chilean population. Since 2004 the data is linked to the
administrative records of the pension scheme, health insurance, Chile Solidario and
other welfare programs. In 2004 new health and wealth questions were added to the
questionnaire. In 2006 and 2009 the sample was kept, and includes approximately
16,000 individuals (15 years and older) of all regions19. The EPS is the first panel survey
conducted in Chile with four rounds of data collection covering this range of thematic
areas. The questionnaires contain questions on labor history and provisional systems,
additional information on education, health, social protection, labor training, property
and patrimony, family history and housing.
For the analysis I focus on specific variables of the EPS database: the dependent
variable is employment duration for private sector workers measured in months, the
main independent variable affiliation to the UISA scheme. I define affiliation to the
UISA scheme as follows: I allocate a binary variable UISA (=0) to all employment
relations that started during the year before the UISA introduction (October 2001 to
September 2002), and I allocate UISA (=1) to all employment relations that started
during the year after the UISA introduction (October 2002 to September 2003). As
affiliation to the new scheme is mandatory for all private sector workers who started a
new employment after the introduction date, I make the assumption that all these
workers are affiliated to the scheme20. Further explanatory variables included are
general information of the worker: gender, age, education, risk aversion, household size,
working household members, children, civil status and work related information of the
worker: contract type, hours worked per week, monthly net income, firm size, region of
employment, and knowledge of UISA21.
The additional explanatory variables are defined as follows: gender is coded as female
(=1), age is the age of the worker in years. Education is split into four dummy variables:
basic education (the reference category), high school, professional formation and higher
education (university and higher). Risk aversion was measured by asking survey
participants about their individual risk assessment on a scale from 0 (for individuals
considering themselves as highly risk averse) to 10 (for individuals stating they are
highly disposed to take risk). Household size, working household members and
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of children in the household. Civil status is defined as married (=1) and includes cohab-
iting. Contract type is coded as temporary contract (=1), and the variable hours are the
average hours worked per week. Income is split into five dummy variables: zero income
(the reference category), income up to 100,000 CLP, between 100,000 and 200,000 CLP,
between 200,000 and 300,000 CLP, and above 300,000 CLP22. Firm size is the number
of workers in the firm. Region of work is captured by a binary variable indicating if the
worker lives in the metropolitan region of Santiago (=1), and knowledge of UISA (=1)
is a self-reported variable of workers indicating if they know or have heard about the
new unemployment protection.
The final sample for the analysis consists of 2,323 employment relations composed
by formal private sectors workers of 18 years and older who started a new employment
during the year before and after UISA introduction. 1,489 employment relations started
during the year before the policy introduction (between October 2001 and September
2002), and workers are not affiliated to the UISA scheme23. 834 employment relations
started in the year after the policy introduction (between October 2002 and September
2003), and workers compulsorily joined the new unemployment scheme. As workers
can start more than one employment during the two years period, the 2,323 employ-
ment relations represent 1,848 single individuals.
Table 2 reports longer employment duration for workers not affiliated to the UISA
scheme. This result can, however, be misleading, as these workers started employment
in the year before the workers affiliated to the scheme. Additionally, 343 observations
are censored, therefore still ongoing at the moment of the last survey round, leading to
an expected downward bias of the estimated mean. Some individuals were also
observed more than once, if they ended their employment within the considered time
frame and started a new employment, and cannot be considered independent
observations24.
For the competing-risk analysis, I additionally take the following event into account,
after finishing the initial employment relation. For workers who ended their employ-
ment within the survey rounds, the distribution of the following event is divided into:
798 individuals changed into a new employment, 864 became unemployed, and 318
became inactive. The following event is approximately equally distributed between
change in employment, and unemployment with ca. 40 percent each. Slightly more
workers face unemployment after terminating their current employment relation,
compared to a new employment contract. Inactivity is observed among 16 percent of
the workers.
I can observe further characteristics of the following employment relation: among all
workers changing into a new employment 85 percent find again a formal employment,
slightly more than half (52 percent) find a permanent position, and approximately 82
percent continue as private sector employees. Another 10 percent decide to work onTable 2 Average employment duration
UISA Months St. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Freq.
Before 31.9 0.80 30.37 33.50 1,489
After 22.8 0.87 21.04 24.47 834
Total 28.6 2,323
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percent change into the public sector and the remainder works in the domestic service
or as family workers25.
5 Method - survival analysis
I conduct the analysis using survival analysis techniques, also known as event history
or duration analysis. It is defined as the analysis of time until the occurrence of a
specific event, from a pre-defined starting point to the transition from one state to
another, conditional that it has not yet occurred. In this analysis the time of interest is
represented by the duration in one employment relation, the event of interest repre-
sented by terminating this employment period. Workers are throughout time “at risk”
of terminating employment and experiencing the failure event (Box-Steffensmeier &
Jones 2004).
Survival analysis is different from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions for a
number of reasons and requires a special framework: first, the normality distribution of
residuals cannot be assumed, as normality of time is unreasonable for many events.
The risk of the event occurring is generally not constant over time and almost certainly
non-symmetric. Second duration, or time to failure, is always positive. And third it
encounters the problem of right censoring: the observed individual participates in the
survey, but the event might not have yet occurred when the survey finishes. In my
analysis the policy was introduced in October 2002, and the last survey round available
records data until early 2010. The workers remaining in their current employment are
no longer observed until the following survey round is conducted and published, and
are censored. In the analysis I assume non-informative censoring meaning that the
censoring time of an individual tells nothing about the risk after that time.
There are three main approaches in survival analysis: non-parametric analysis, the
semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards (PH) model and parametric models. While
non-parametric and semi-parametric models compare subjects at the time when
failures actually occur, parametric models use probabilities that describe what occurs
over the whole interval given the information of the subject during time xj (Cleves,
Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010). To be more specific: non-parametric analysis
assumes no functional form of the survivor function and makes therefore no assump-
tion about the hazard or cumulative hazard, so “letting the data set speak for itself”.
The effects of additional sets of covariates are not modeled either, and the comparison
is performed on a qualitative level. In the semi-parametric Cox model the parametric
shape is equally left unspecified, but the model assumes that covariates have propor-
tional baseline hazards. Parametric models are either written in the hazard
parameterization, or in the log-time parameterization, also known as accelerated failure
time (AFT) metric. All parametric models make assumptions about the shape of the
hazard function, with the simplest being the exponential model assuming a constant
hazard over time. Further models include Weibull or Gompertz distributions (flat,
monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rates), log-normal and log-logistic
models (non-monotonic hazard rates) and the flexible three-parameter generalized
gamma distribution (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010).
Estimates are obtained by calculating the maximum likelihood for parametric, and by cal-
culating the partial likelihood for semi-parametric models. Breslow or Efron approximations
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maximum likelihood function assuming non-informative censoring includes censored
observations with survival time ti and failure indicator di (taking the value 1 for failures and

















(Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010) and (Rodríguez 2010).
In a first step, I estimate the survivor function without assuming any particular func-
tional form. The Kaplan-Meier estimator, the non-parametric estimator of the survivor
function S(t), estimates the probability of survival past a certain time t and is given by






where nj represents the number of individuals at risk at time tj and dj represents the
number of failures at time tj. This stepwise function shows the survival of workers in
their employment, presenting first results of survival between workers who are affiliated
to the UISA scheme compared to those who are not.
In a second step, I analyze the survival of employment using the semi-parametric Cox
model. The Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972) and (Cox 1975) is given by
λ t xj
  ¼ λ0 tð Þ exp xj βx  ð4Þ
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard and xjβx the covariates and regression parameters. The
baseline hazard is not given a particular parametrization and is left unestimated. The model
makes no assumption about the hazard shape over time, but all individuals are assumed to
have the same hazard over time, meaning that the hazard rate for any two individuals at
any point in time is proportional (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010).
In a third step, I select a functional form for the hazard rate using the Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) and parameterize the shape of the hazard function. Parametric
estimations use probabilities that describe the data over the whole time interval given
what is known about the observations during this time.
Parametric models are written in two different ways:
in the hazard metric,
h t xj
  ¼ h0 tð Þ exp xj βx  ð5Þ
or in the log-time metric, also known as the AFT metric,
In tj
  ¼ xj βx þ ∈j: ð6Þ
Hazard parameterizations can fit exponential, Weibull and Gompertz distribu-tions. Widely used log-time parameterizations are exponential, Weibull, log-normal,
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Marchenko 2010).
In a fourth and final step, I apply a competing-risk model to the data, where the
endpoint consists of several distinct events and the failure can be attributed to one
event exclusively to the others. In a competing risk model I am interested in the cause-
specific hazard function:
λj tð Þ ¼ limΔ→0þ Pðt ≤T < t þ Δt T ≥ tj ÞΔt : ð7Þ
where λj indicates the hazard rate for a single-state process where the hazard rate is
subscripted for each of the j events that can occur. To conduct the analysis I censor all
events, but the event of interest. Each part of the product can then be estimated
separately and I obtain risk-specific hazard rates. As before, I can equally conduct non-
parametric, semi-parametric and parametric analysis.
6 Empirical analysis and results
The analysis is conducted by dividing the employment relations into two groups:
workers who started during the year before UISA introduction and who are not affili-
ated to the scheme, and workers who started during the year after UISA introduction
and had to compulsory join the scheme. This binary variable (UISA = 0/1) allows a
comparison of employment duration before and after the policy introduction.
The main results of the empirical analysis can be summarized as follows: in the first
part of the analysis I focus exclusively on the failure event of terminating the current
employment. Affiliation to UISA is significant and increases the hazard of leaving
employment, or accelerates time to failure, throughout all regressions irrespective of
the method selected or the covariates included in the regressions. In the second part of
the analysis, results are qualitatively comparable if the following event is a new
employment relation or unemployment: affiliation to UISA is significant throughout all
regressions. This is however not the case for workers becoming inactive after terminating
their current employment: the difference between both groups is not significant for the
Kaplan-Meier estimator, the simple regression or the base specification. Only in the final
model UISA affiliation becomes significant. Quantitatively the effect is larger for workers
becoming unemployed or inactive, compared to workers changing employment26.
6.1 Non-parametric analysis
I start the empirical analysis with the Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator: Figure 1(a) plots
the overall Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, and Figure 1(b) the estimates before and
after UISA introduction. Figure 1(a) shows a high hazard rate of employment termin-
ation during the first year of employment: after approximately twelve months, half of
all workers have terminated their current employment contract. From twelve to ap-
proximately 45 months another quarter of workers terminate employment. Afterwards
the number of surviving workers continues declining in a steady and moderate pace,
until the final survey round finishes and approximately 15 percent of the sample is still
employed and therefore censored. In Figure 1(b) survival is similar during the first
months of employment and starts diverging after approximately ten months, showing
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
Figure 1 KM survival estimates. (a) overall. (b) before and after UISA introduction.
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p-value of 0.000 the logrank test rejects the null hypothesis that both estimates are
equal and concludes that the difference in employment survival is statistically
significant. Returning a p-value of 0.000, the Wilcoxon result equally rejects the
null-hypothesis27.
6.2 Semi-parametric Cox model
I continue with the simple Cox model, where I regress the main independent variable
UISA on employment duration. Regression (1) in Table 3 returns a coefficient of 0.273.
Expressed in hazard rates the hazard of leaving employment is approximately 1.314
times higher for workers affiliated to the UISA scheme (hazard increases by 31.4
percent) and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Next, I test the PH assumption of the simple Cox model. I start with a graphical analysis
and plot the hazards of both groups. The hazards are estimated over the range of
observed failure times, and all failure times contribute to the estimate of the baseline
hazard. The hazard ratios in the figures are approximately proportional28. I also conduct a
formal test based on Schoenfeld residuals. This test retrieves the residuals, fits a smooth
function of time to them, and tests whether there is a relationship. For this test time is
log-transformed. The result p = 0.441 suggests that there is no evidence of non-
proportionality. I do an additional formal test by introducing an interaction between the
UISA variable and time. For the test time is log-transformed and the result (p = 0.427)
equally suggests that there is no evidence that the UISA effect changes with ln(time).
I start the multiple Cox regressions by specifying a base specification. I expect the
following variables to have an effect on the decision of remaining in employment:
gender, age, contract type and education. All variables are statistically significant at the
1 percent level, except for age significant at the 5 percent level. The education dummies
are collectively significant at the 1 percent level. While UISA affiliation, female, and a
temporary contract increase the hazard of leaving employment, the hazard decreases
with age and a higher educational level. With a coefficient of 0.282 the effect of the
UISA variable is similar to the simple regression, translating into a hazard ratio of
1.327, or a 32.7 percent increase in the hazard of terminating employment.
Afterwards I test additional sets of covariates. First I add average net income, total
hours worked per week and firm size to capture information on type, place and quality
Table 3 Regression table Cox model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coefficients




Female 0.293*** 0.202*** 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 0.203*** 0.171***
Age −0.005** −0.004* −0.004 −0.005* −0.005** −0.005** −0.005** −0.005**
Temp. Contract 0.987*** 0.916*** 0.912*** 0.922*** 0.923*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.758***
Education
- High School −0.207*** −0.140** −0.149** −0.131** −0.147** −0.148** −0.150** 0.004
- Prof. Formation −0.238*** −0.109 −0.119 −0.099 −0.105 −0.099 −0.101 0.131
- Univ. and
higher
−0.444*** −0.201 −0.201 −0.153 −0.209* −0.211* −0.211* −0.016
Hours 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
Income
- 100,000 CLP 0.073 0.066 0.062 0.084 0.066 0.067 0.085
- 200,000 CLP −0.200 −0.196 −0.215 −0.192 −0.202 −0.201 −0.191
- 300,000 CLP −0.433 −0.444 −0.438* −0.444 −0.439 −0.442 −0.431
> 300,000 CLP −0.538* −0.547* −0.519* −0.541* −0.539* −0.543** −0.540*
Firm Size 0.000
Risk Aversion 0.006
























Log Likelihood −14,022 −13,728 −11,200 −11,199 −10,691 −11,362 −11,362 −11,362 −11,345
AIC 28, 047 27,469 22,427 22,425 21,413 22,752 22,753 22,751 22,723
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.020 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.025
Wald Test
Education
0.000 0.132 0.106 0.234 0.099 0.092 0.088 0.005
Wald Test
Income
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exit 1,980 1,976 1,649 1,649 1,585 1,670 1,670 1,670 1,670
At Risk 66,530 66,484 62,479 62,586 59,108 63,427 63,427 63,427 63,427
N 2,323 2,319 1,982 1,981 1,899 2,006 2,006 2,006 2,006
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(Std. Err. clustered by ID).
Notes: Instead of hazard ratios, coefficients are reported in this table: positive coefficients increase the hazard, negative
coefficients decrease the hazard. Hazard ratios are obtained by taking the exponential of the coefficient.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/9of work. Second individual risk aversion, third number of household members, working
household members, civil status and number of children to capture information on the
household composition, fourth region of work, and fifth knowledge of the UISA
scheme. Affiliation to UISA, gender, and contract type remain statistically significant
throughout all regressions, while age and education vary over the regressions. The
coefficient of UISA almost doubles after including the income dummies, increasing the
effect of UISA affiliation when income is hold constant. Throughout all regressions,
income is collectively significant at the 1 percent level. Hours worked per week is
significant at the 5 percent level, while firm size, individual risk aversion, working house-
hold members, civil status, number of children, region and knowledge of UISA are not
significant. Although household size is not significant in the Cox model, I decide to keep
this variable as it returns significant results in other regressions. Regression (8) in Table 3
presents the final Cox model, including all variables of the base specification, hours
worked, average net income and household size. The UISA coefficient increases to 0.517
in the final model, translating into a hazard ratio of 1.677, or a 67.7 percent increase in
the hazard of terminating employment when affiliated to the UISA scheme.
Finally, I test a number of interaction terms in regression (9)29. The following inter-
action terms are significant: UISA × contract type, and UISA × education dummies.
Having a temporary contract and affiliation to the UISA scheme additionally increases
the hazard of terminating employment, above and beyond the single effects of the
variables. For the other interaction term, UISA × education dummies, the hazard
decreases with higher education if workers are affiliated to the UISA scheme.
Next the PH assumption is tested for the base specification, the final Cox model and
the Cox model with interactions. For the Cox model to be valid and to satisfy the PH
assumption, the global PH test must return p-values above the threshold of 10 percent.
The global PH test reports for the three regressions p-values of 0.000, rejecting the PH
assumption and making the Cox model invalid30. While UISA affiliation and education
suggest that there is no evidence of non-proportionality in the base specification,
gender, age and contract type report p-values below the 10 percent threshold. In the
final Cox model various variables have low p-values: UISA affiliation, gender, age,
contract type, and the income dummies. The results are similar for the interaction
model, except for UISA affiliation and gender, where the p-values are above the
threshold value. A stratified Cox model presents a possible solution when certain
covariates do not satisfy the PH assumption (Ata & Sözer 2007).
Stratified Cox model
Due to the previous results, I relax the assumption that every individual faces the same
baseline hazard,
h t xj
  ¼ h0 tð Þ exp xjβx  ð8Þ
in favor of
h t xj
  ¼ h01 tð Þ exp xjβx ; if j is ingroup1 ð9Þ
h t xj
  ¼ h02 tð Þ exp xjβx ; if j is ingroup2 ð10Þ
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coefficients βx continue to be the same (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010).
Covariates returning high p-values are assumed to satisfy the PH assumption and are
included in the model, while covariates that do not fulfill this criterion and report low
p-values are stratified (Ata & Sözer 2007).
I apply the stratified model to the data: after testing different sets of stratified regres-
sions, I stratify contract type in the base specification, and age, contract type and hours
in the final model and the interaction model. The global PH tests return a p-value of
0.182 for the base specification, a p-value of 0.813 for the final model and a p-value of
0.717 for the interaction model, rejecting the evidence of non-proportionality. Using
the stratified Cox model is therefore more appropriate for the data. The coefficients of
UISA affiliation remain similar, suggesting quantitatively comparable effects as in the
previous Cox regression Table31.
6.3 Parametric models
I start the parametric analysis by comparing the six parametric model shapes using the
Akaike Information Criterion. The AIC penalizes each model’s log likelihood to reflect
the number of parameters estimated (Akaike 1974). The preferred model distribution is
the one with the lowest AIC value, in my case the generalized gamma distribution.
Using this distribution, I run four regressions (simple model, base specification, final
model and interaction model) and compare the results in Table 4: the UISA variable is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all regressions, as well as age, contract
type, hours worked and income. In all four regressions the UISA coefficient is negative,
implying “accelerated” time to failure. Expressed as time ratios, the simple model
returns a value of 0.781, suggesting that time to failure is approximately 21.9 percent
lower compared to workers not affiliated to the scheme. In the base specification time
to failure is less accelerated for UISA affiliates with a time ratio of 0.850. When adding
the income variables to the regressions in the final and interaction model, the UISA co-
efficient value decreases. The results return a time ratio of 0.627 and 0.628 (marginal
effect). Education is not significant in the final model, while income is significant at the
1 and 10 percent level in the base specification and the interaction model, respectively.
The interaction terms are significant at the 5 percent level, and confirm the previous
interpretation: affiliation to the UISA scheme and having a temporary contract add-
itionally accelerate time to failure, while the interaction UISA × education decelerates
time to employment termination. Analyzing the parameters, the special cases of the
generalized gamma distribution Weibull (κ = 1), log-normal (κ = 0) and the exponential
distribution (κ = σ = 1) are not fulfilled.
As a last step in the parametric analysis, I run the final model, and estimate the
hazard functions based on the generalized gamma distribution32. Figure 2(a)
returns the overall hazard, indicating a steep increase in the hazard rate during the
first year of employment, with a peak after approximately 12 months, and a steady
decline thereafter. Figure 2(b) shows the hazard function before and after UISA
introduction, with a considerably higher hazard rate for UISA affiliates, diverging
especially during the first two years of employment, and converging over the
remaining time. The peak after approximately one year is more pronounced for
workers affiliated to UISA.
Table 4 Generalized gamma regressions
Variable Simple model Base specification Final model Interactions
Acceleration parameters
UISA −0.247*** −0.162*** −0.467*** −0.567***
- UISA marg. effect −0.465***
Female −0.239*** −0.179*** −0.157**
Age 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009***
Temp. Contract −1.305*** −1.203*** −1.080***
Education
- High School 0.146** 0.068 −0.066
- Prof. Formation 0.218** 0.042 −0.125
- Univ. and higher 0.481*** 0.141 −0.017
Hours −0.011*** −0.011***
Income
- 100,000 CLP 0.095 0.133
- 200,000 CLP 0.453** 0.493**
- 300,000 CLP 0.745*** 0.772***
> 300,000 CLP 0.901*** 0.934***
Household Size 0.026* 0.026*
UISA × Temp. Contract −0.294**
UISA × High School 0.331***
UISA × Prof. Formation 0.422**
UISA × Univ. and higher 0.398
_const 2.270*** 2.919*** 3.258*** 3.282***
/ln_sig 0.306*** 0.221*** 0.206*** 0.199***
/kappa −0.897*** −0.371*** −0.235*** −0.191**
sigma 1.358 1.247 1.228 1.220
Log Likelihood −3,873 −3,575 −3,024 −3,015
AIC 7,754 7,170 6,081 6,070
Wald Test Education 0.000 0.678 0.059
Wald Test Income 0.000 0.000
Employment Exit 1,980 1,976 1,670 1,670
At Risk 66,530 66,484 63,427 63,427
N 2,323 2,319 2,006 2,006
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(Std. Err. clustered by ID).
Notes: The coefficients reported in Table 4 are expressed as τj = exp(−xjβx)tj and are called the acceleration parameters. If
coefficients are negative, they “accelerate” time, so failure is expected to occur sooner; if coefficients are positive, they
“decelerate” time, so failure is expected to occur later. If coefficients are equal to zero, then time passes at its “normal”
rate (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko 2010). Another option are exponentiated coefficients, which are interpreted
as time ratios.
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In a competing-risk model the failure event can occur for more than one reason. In this
dataset terminating employment can lead to three different events: to another employ-
ment contract (T1), to unemployment (T2), or to inactivity (T3). I can equally conduct
non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric analysis. As before, I start with non-
parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates, continue with the semi-parametric Cox model and















































Figure 2 Hazard functions. (a) overall. (b) before and after UISA introduction. Notes: Hazard functions are
performed on the final model.
Nagler IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 16 of 252013, 2:9
http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/96.4.1 Non-parametric analysis
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates show employment survival before and after UISA
introduction in Figure 3 depending on the event that follows the current employment
termination. For Figure 3(a) and (b) the logrank and Wilcoxon test return p-values of
0.000, however not for Figure 3(c). For inactivity as the following event, the logrank test
returns a p-value of 0.451, and the Wilcoxon test a p-value of 0.206, translating into no
significant difference between both groups. While UISA affiliation makes a difference if
workers change employment or become unemployed, it appears to be irrelevant for
workers becoming inactive. In the first two cases the hazard ratio of UISA affiliates is
higher compared to the workers not affiliated to the scheme.
6.4.2 Semi-parametric Cox model
Based on the regression Table 3 of the semi-parametric analysis, I run the simple
regression (1), the base specification (2) and the final model (3)33. The results in Table 5
vary depending on the event following employment termination. If workers change their
employment, UISA affiliation, gender, and contract type are statistically significant
variables, while age, education, hours worked, income and household size do not return
significant results. If workers become unemployed all variables are significant at the 1
percent level, except of household size. For the last option, inactivity, the picture changes
over the regressions: while UISA affiliation does not return significant results for the
simple model and the base specification, it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level
in the final model. The remaining variables are significant at the 1 or 5 percent level,
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Figure 3 KM survival estimates. (a) T1 - Employment. (b) T2 - Unemployment. (c) T3 - Inactivity.
Table 5 Regression table Cox model
Variable T1 - Employment T2 - Unemployment T3 - Inactivity
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Coefficients
UISA 0.314*** 0.318*** 0.375*** 0.301*** 0.310*** 0.645*** 0.090 0.050 0.504***
Female −0.275*** −0.297*** 0.363*** 0.358*** 1.371*** 1.102***
Age −0.004 −0.004 −0.013*** −0.013*** 0.012** 0.013*
Temp. Contract 0.643*** 0.642*** 1.239*** 1.217*** 1.204*** 0.849***
Education
- High School 0.006 0.034 −0.307*** −0.276*** −0.379*** −0.294*
- Prof. Formation 0.077 0.139 −0.671*** −0.538*** 0.063 0.323
- Univ. and
higher
−0.069 0.003 −1.142*** −0.803*** −0.028 0.426
Hours −0.000 0.015*** 0.005
Income
- 100,000 CLP −0.303 0.350 0.433
- 200,00 CLP −0.499* 0.149 −0.086
- 300,000 CLP −0.629** −0.099 −0.819
> 300,000 CLP −0.576* −0.439 −1.086
Household Size −0.010 −0.024 −0.031
Log Likelihood −5,556 −5,510 −5,056 −6,180 −5,940 −4,618 −2,285 −2,160 −1,588
AIC 11,114 11,033 10,139 12,363 11,895 9,261 4,572 4,334 3,201
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.035 0.045 0.000 0.055 0.056
Wald Test
Education






798 798 741 864 860 689 318 318 240
At Risk 66,530 66,484 63,427 66,530 66,484 63,427 66,530 66,484 63,427
N 2,323 2,319 2,006 2,323 2,319 2,006 2,323 2,319 2,006
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(Std. Err. adjusted clustered by ID).
Notes: Regressions (1) present the simple model, regressions (2) the base specification, and regressions (3) the
final model.
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coefficient returns a value of 0.375, translating into a hazard ratio of 1.455 or a 45.5
percent increase in the hazard of terminating employment when the next event is a
new employment relation, the coefficient almost doubles to 0.645, translating into a
hazard ratio of 1.906 or a 90.6 percent increase in the hazard of terminating employ-
ment when the following event is unemployment. For inactivity as the next event, the
coefficient returns a value of 0.504, or a hazard ratio of 1.655 (65.5 percent increase in
the hazard of terminating employment). While UISA affiliation has an effect on the
duration of employment in all three cases and increases the hazard of terminating
employment, the effect is the highest for workers becoming unemployed. The effect is
also higher for inactivity compared to changing employment. A possible explanation
could present the direct benefit of receiving the accumulated savings in the case of
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benefits, but reduced opportunity costs.
I test again the PH assumption, and to consolidate the analysis, I test the assumption
for the final model only. None of the regressions fulfill the PH assumption: the values
returned for the global PH test are 0.000 in all cases, suggesting that hazards are non-
proportional35. Age and contract type are stratified and the global PH test results
suggest that the stratified Cox model is valid in all three cases.
The coefficients of the stratified Cox model return qualitatively and quantitatively com-
parable results as in Table 5. Irrelevant of the event following employment termination,
UISA affiliation is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Affiliation to
the new scheme increases the hazard of workers leaving their current employment and is
quantitatively similar to the previous Cox regressions: the hazard of terminating employ-
ment increases by 42.6 percent if workers change their employment, by 75.6 percent if
workers become unemployed, and by 83.1 percent if workers become inactive36.
6.4.3 Parametric models
As a last step I fit parametric models and proceed as before. I concentrate on the final
model, and test the preferred hazard shape for the different parametric models. The
gamma distribution is the preferred model shape for T1 and T2, and the log-normal
distribution for T3. As the AIC of the log-normal distribution is only marginally below
the AIC of the gamma distribution, I also use the latter shape for T3.
In Table 6 all UISA coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
UISA coefficients return again considerably lower acceleration parameters for un-
employment and inactivity: while UISA affiliation accelerates failure in all cases, the
effect is more pronounced if workers become unemployed or inactive after terminating
their current employment. The time ratios are 0.705 for employment, 0.563 for
unemployment, and 0.535 for inactivity when taking the exponentiated coefficient.
An interesting aspect is the gender coefficient: women have a lower hazard of termin-
ating employment if the following event is a new employment relation, but have an
increased hazard of terminating employment if the following event is unemployment,
and especially when becoming inactive. Different contribution patterns by women
towards household income might present one possible explanation. While a job change
can enhance career perspectives and often implies higher earnings, it might be more
actively pursued by male workers, still expected to earn the bulk of income within the
household. Female employees earn on average 45,000 CLP less compared to male
employees in my sample, and female earnings might be seen for many families as an
additional contribution to household income, but not as the principal salary. Women
are therefore more likely to give up participation in the labor market and become
inactive to dedicate more time to family and household labor.
Among the other explanatory variables education is not significant when changing
job, it however decelerates time to failure when the following event is unemployment
and is significant at the 1 percent level, while the effect is the opposite for inactivity.
The variable hour is only significant when the following event is unemployment and
accelerates time to failure. Income is significant in all cases and decelerates time to
failure with increasing income. Household size is significant at the 10 percent level
when becoming unemployed and slightly decelerates time.
Table 6 Generalized gamma regressions
Variable T1 - Employment T2 - Unemployment T3 - Inactivity
Acceleration parameters
UISA −0.349*** −0.575*** −0.625***
Female 0.362*** −0.375*** −1.234***
Age 0.006 0.013*** −0.007
Temp. Contract −0.966*** −1.474*** −1.095***
Education
- High School −0.103 0.194* 0.254
- Prof. Formation −0.280* 0.616*** −0.455
- Univ. and higher −0.025 0.754*** −0.712**
Hours −0.002 −0.019*** −0.014
Income
- 100,000 CLP 0.484* −0.075 −0.390
- 200,000 CLP 0.811*** 0.178 0.294
- 300,000 CLP 0.980*** 0.477 1.054
> 300,000 CLP 0.903*** 0.891** 1.423*
Household Size 0.017 0.034* 0.036
_cons 3.163*** 4.885*** 7.109***
/ln_sig 0 .497*** 0.465*** 0.820***
/kappa −0.624*** −0.209 −0.410
sigma 1.644 1.592 2.270
Log Likelihood −1,913 −1,817 −876
AIC 3,857 3,666 1,783
Wald Test Education 0.362 0.001 0.003
Wald Test Income 0.002 0.001 0.000
Employment Exit 741 689 240
At Risk 63,427 63,427 63,427
N 2,006 2,006 2,006
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(Std. Err. adjusted clustered by ID).
Notes: All regressions are based on the final model.
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in all cases UISA affiliates have a higher hazard of terminating employment, irrespect-
ive of the following event. The shape is comparable, with a steep hazard increase during




































































Figure 4 Hazard functions before and after UISA introduction. (a) T1 - Employment. (b) T2 - Unemploy-
ment. (c) T3 - Inactivity. Notes: Hazard functions are performed on the final model.
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To examine the causal impact I conduct four different falsification tests: first, I simply
change the cut-off date from October 2002 to October 2003 “as if” the introduction
date began one year later: if this alternative cut-off date is used, the UISA variable is no
longer significant when running the same set of regressions. Second, I use an extended
time frame including workers who started a new employment during the two years
before and the two years after UISA introduction. This sample returns qualitatively the
same, and quantitatively similar results as in the one year sample used for the analysis.
A more detailed explanation, including regression results, can be found in Additional
file 1. Third, I select formal public sector workers as a control group and introduce the
UISA variable with the same cut-off date “as if” this group had experienced the policy
introduction. In this sample, the UISA variable is not significant, indicating that public
sectors employees that were not affected by this policy do indeed not show a significant
difference in employment duration. A more detailed explanation can be found in
Additional file 1. Fourth and last, I check the unemployment rate in Chile during the
year before and after UISA introduction: while the average unemployment rate was 8.4
percent in the year before, it marginally decreased to 8.3 percent in the year after. In
the time period Sep-Nov 2001 it amounted to 8.3 percent, during the period Sep-Nov
2002 to 8.5 and during the period Sep-Nov 2003 it slightly decreased to 7.8 percent37.
Therefore no sharp change in unemployment was experienced during the two year
period considered in the analysis.
While these tests give confidence in effectively observing a causal impact of UISA
introduction on employment duration, a number of issues remain uncertain: although
the policy demands compulsory affiliation to the policy, it is not clear if firms could
circumvent affiliation when offering a new employment contract after October 2002.
Another aspect is the limited knowledge and use of UISA benefits, as shown by Poblete
(2011) in her paper, and might therefore not affect employment duration among
workers with no or little knowledge of the new policy. Further aspects to take into
consideration are the low benefit transfers, and the one month waiting period to access
account savings, that might have little impact on the worker’s behavior.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the impact of UISA on employment duration in Chile and was
motivated by two questions: (i) whether the introduction of UISA has an effect on
employment duration and therefore on labor mobility, and (ii) on the magnitude of this
effect. Based on my results, I conclude that the introduction of UISA significantly
affects employment duration, characterized by an increased hazard ratio of exiting the
current employment in the semi-parametric Cox regressions, and by accelerated time
to failure in the parametric models. In the remaining section I first summarize the
results, before discussing policy implications in the second part.
In the simple Cox regression the hazard is elevated by 31.4 percent for UISA
affiliates, while the difference amounts to 67.7 percent in the final model. The results
of the stratified models are similar. The parametric models, based on the generalized
gamma distribution, return qualitatively the same result: time to failure is accelerated if
workers are affiliated to UISA. The time ratio returns a coefficient of 0.627 for UISA
affiliates in the final model, suggesting that time to failure is 37.3 percent lower.
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follows: in the Cox model the hazard of leaving employment increases by 45.5 percent
if another employment relation follows employment termination, by 90.6 percent if
workers become unemployed, and by 65.5 percent if workers become inactive. The
parametric generalized gamma regressions return qualitatively comparable results,
where time is accelerated for all following events if workers are affiliated to UISA. The
time ratios are 0.705, 0.563, and 0.535, respectively, suggesting that time to failure is
29.5 percent lower for employment and approximately 45 percent lower for unemploy-
ment or inactivity as the next event, compared to workers with the same next event
not affiliated to the scheme. A possible explanation for the relative lower hazard
(or higher time ratio) in case of employment change, is the lack of direct monetary
benefits, as a decrease in opportunity costs is not immediately perceived.
Taking reduced employment duration as an indicator for higher labor market flexibil-
ity, these results suggest that the policy led to its desired outcome of tackling previously
more rigid labor markets in Chile. UISA can therefore present an alternative for emer-
ging and developing economies that seek to protect their workforce in times of
unemployment and to improve labor market rigidities, while avoiding some problems
related to unemployment insurance (e.g. high monitoring costs to reduce moral
hazard). It is however important to keep in mind that only formal private sector
employees are covered under this policy in Chile and that informal workers continue to
be unprotected and excluded from any kind of unemployment protection (Sehnbruch
2004). While Chile has a relative large formal labor market, other developing countries
present significantly higher proportions of informality, restricting this scheme to
workers that already have access to often comprehensive social security rights.
This policy certainly presents an alternative design in unemployment protection for
developing nations with limited financial and monitoring capacities, but could equally
present an option for developed countries, for example as an additional component
combined with unemployment insurance based on risk-pooling. Moral hazard has been
widely reported. Depleting the individual savings account before receiving access to the
common fund could present a possible approach to restrict misuse.
Based on the analysis, further topics are on the agenda in Chile: low female labor
market participation, a high share of temporary and often precarious employment
contracts, limited knowledge of UISA, and the rather low amount of benefits. Women
and workers with a temporary contract show significant higher hazard rates of termin-
ating employment throughout the analysis. While labor market flexibility increases the
dynamic and productivity of labor, it could also lead to unstable labor relations,
generating situations, where the more vulnerable workers cannot access benefits as they
are unable to fulfill the minimal conditions. In the competing risk analysis it further
shows that women have a lower hazard of changing into a new employment, but a
higher hazard of becoming unemployed or inactive compared to men, hinting to a
more traditional attitude towards female labor market participation. While limited
knowledge of UISA does not have a significant impact on labor duration in my sample,
it might still prevent a share of workers from receiving benefits. And although the new
UISA scheme certainly increases overall benefits, total amounts continue to be low,
leading to restricted consumption smoothing and a possible severe drop in household
income during unemployment spells.
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has been implemented in May 2009. A first paper by Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco (2012)
assesses changes in job search behavior between workers who decide to use unemploy-
ment benefits compared to those who decide against it before and after the reform.
Further research may therefore focus on a more detailed examination of the UISA
design and in particular on reforms, for example on the effect of specific scheme
requirements after which workers become eligible to withdraw accumulated benefits or
receive access to the solidarity fund. Another interesting aspect for future research is
the type and quality of jobs workers find after they change employment or after
unemployment spells.
Endnotes
1For each completed year of employment, workers are entitled to one month severance
pay with a maximum of eleven years.
2Article 161 of the labor code: dismissal due to company needs (economic reason or
downsizing).
3See Section 3 (Severance pay and labor mobility - what do we know?) for a more
detailed discussion on the effects of severance pay and on severance pay in Chile.
4Benefits were indexed to the minimum wage to reflect purchasing power; the
observed minimum wage growth was however always below the average wage growth
within the economy. This resulted in decreasing replacement rates over time: from 14.8
percent in 1985 to 6.3 percent in 1995 to 4.4 percent in 2001. Replacement rates
increased to over 30 percent after UISA introduction compared to Social Security
benefits (Ferrada 2010).
5These additional support programs were often uncoordinated and ineffective.
For the workfare programs only minimum wages were paid, the discretionary de-
sign presented problems, and the rushed implementation in times of crisis led to
suboptimal program design. The hiring subsidies in times of high unemployment,
in turn, were expensive (about USD 60 million), and abuse of the program was
widely reported. Unemployment insurance for domestic helpers only covered this
small sector of domestic employees, and job search assistance was only performed
at the local level leading to limited geographical coverage (Acevedo, Eskenasi, &
Pagés 2006).
6In my sample only 5 workers who started in the year before UISA introduction
changed to the new system, presenting below 0.5 percent of the sample. I excluded
these workers from my analysis. Huneeus, Leiva, & Micco (2012) report 2 percent
voluntary affiliation by December 2010 in their paper.
7Since a reform in May 2009 workers with temporary contracts are also eligible to
receive unemployment benefits through the solidarity pillar. The paper by Huneeus,
Leiva, & Micco (2012) describes the 2009 reform in more detail.
8Additional file 1 includes two figures with an overview of the financing of the
Chilean UISA scheme.
9Also in case of just cause, including the following events: expiration of contract,
voluntary resignation, or misconduct.
10Cross-country evidence, among others: Boeri & Garibaldi (2009), Gomez-Salvador,
Messina, & Vallanti (2004), Messina & Vallanti (2007).
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/911Among others: Haffner et al. (2001), Heckman & Pagés (2000), Haltiwanger,
Scarpetta and Vodopivec (2003).
12For a more extensive literature overview on severance pay, see also Holzman et al.
(2011).
13In my sample only 56 percent of workers received severance pay if employment
was terminated by economic necessities or a shutdown of the firm. Before the introduc-
tion of UISA 59 percent received severance pay compared to 51 percent after the policy
introduction. This difference is however not significant due to a low number of
observations.
14Among others: Feldstein & Altman (2007), Fölster (1999; 2001), Vodopivec
(2010).
15They value the benefits to different extent, depending on risk aversion, gender and
educational level, but always equal or more than its costs. The authors conduct an
evaluation of worker’s lifetime utility with and without UISA: lifetime consumption
preferences of individuals are described with a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
allowing them to smooth consumption while economically active.
16Database used: Administrative records of the contribution history and benefits paid
to the workers affiliated to the unemployment benefit program by the Superintendencia
de Pensiones.
17Encuesta de Protección Social in Spanish, or social protection survey.
18The survey is conducted by the Centre for Microdata, Department of Economics,
of the University of Chile (Centro Microdatos, Universidad de Chile) with the support
of the University of Pennsylvania.
19In each survey round three different types of questionnaires account for repeated,
new and deceased participants.
20This binary variable is not a self-reported variable, nor does it include any informa-
tion on benefit collection.
21Summary statistics of all variables in Additional file 1. See also Additional file 1 for
the construction and definitions of these variables.
22On 30 September 2013: 1 USD = 505 CLP [www.xe.com].
23See also footnote 6: I exclude all workers who voluntarily changed to the new UISA
scheme. Only 5 workers in my sample did so, representing less than 0.5 percent of the
sample.
24Repeated spells: throughout the analysis I run the regressions by clustering the
observations by their unique identifier. By specifying clusters the single observations
are not considered independent, but the clusters defined. Due to repeated spells in the
data set, I clustered the ID of the observations, as the same worker can be observed
more than once since more than one job can be started during the two year period
considered. It is reasonable to assume independence of individuals, but not within
different observations of the same individual. Specifying the ID clusters in the regres-
sions, I obtain robust standard errors. In case of observing intra-cluster correlations,
the robust standard errors are better indicators for estimator variability, resulting in
more accurate outcomes. Models with individual-level frailties (random-effect models
in survival analysis) did not converge in the semi-parametric analysis.
25Separating the employment characteristics by UISA affiliation, the differences are
not statistically significant, except for contract type, marginally significant at the 10
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relation if they are not affiliated to UISA, 48.5 percent find one if affiliated.
26In addition to the continuous time analysis, I run the regressions based on discrete
time analysis and use the complementary log-log regression (the discrete-time propor-
tional hazards model) to compare if results are similar: the cloglog regressions return
qualitatively comparable results, where the UISA variable is statistically significant at a
1 percent level throughout the regressions and equally increases the hazard of leaving
employment. Coefficients are quantitatively above the results of continuous time ana-
lysis, the difference is however minor.
27With the logrank test I test the null hypothesis that the probability of employment sur-
vival of both groups is the same at any point of time. It compares the survival of both
groups by taking the follow-up period into account (Bland & Altman 2004). The Wilcoxon
test is a rank test which places additional weight to earlier failure times than failures later in
the distribution compared to the logrank test. In case the hazard functions are not propor-
tional, this test is preferred over the logrank test (Cleves, Gutierrez, Gould, & Marchenko
2010). I conduct both tests, as the proportionality assumption has not yet been tested.
28Figures not included in the paper, available upon request.
29Interactions tested: UISA*Female, UISA*Age, UISA*Temp. Contract, UISA*Educa-
tion Dummies, UISA*Income Categories, UISA*Household Size, Female*Age, Female*-
Temp. Contract, Age*Temp. Contract, Temp. Contract*Hours, Temp. Contract*Income
Categories, Temp. Contract*Household Size.
30See Additional file 1: Table S7.
31See Additional file 1: Table S8.
32I concentrate on the final model, as the AIC returns only marginally lower values
for the interaction model. I additionally run the hazard functions with the interactions
models, and the figures return qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
33I exclude the interaction model to consolidate the competing-risk analysis.
34I concentrate on the coefficients of the final model.
35See Additional file 1: Table S9.
36See Additional file 1: Table S10.
37Unemployment statistics taken from the “Instituto Naticional de Estadística” (National
Statistics Institute) [09.10.2013].Additional file
: Appendix A: Overview UISA Scheme, Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics, Appendix C: Test of
Proportional Hazards Assumption, Appendix D: Stratified Cox Model, Appendix E: Extended Sample, Appendix F:
Control Group - Public Sector Employees.
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